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The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015: 
A Critical Assessment of its Operation and Impact 
 
 
Mathias M Siems and Oscar Alvarez-Macotela* 
 
 
 
Abstract: The OECD promotes the 2015 version of the Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance as a means ‘to support investment as a powerful driver of growth’. But how realis-
tic is this ambition? This paper provides a critical assessment of the operation and im-
pact of these Principles. It maps the governance model of the Principles and discusses 
their impact on state legislation and at the firm level. It concludes there are various 
problems with the operation of the Principles as far as they are regarded as a universal 
benchmark, while they can be a useful ‘common frame of reference’ for the debate 
about corporate governance reform in academia and practice. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) promotes the 
G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015 as a means ‘to support invest-
ment as a powerful driver of growth’.1 Indeed, there may be reasons why the OECD 
could be confident about the impact of its Principles of Corporate Governance. The 34 
members and five partner countries of the OECD belong to the wealthiest of the world 
and account for 80% of world trade and investment.
2
 Beyond its members and partners, 
the OECD plays an important role at a global scale since its recommendations are often 
aimed at the law makers of less developed countries and businesses themselves. For ex-
ample, its Principles of Corporate Governance (in the following: ‘Principles’) are in-
tended to assist governments as well as stock exchanges, investors and private corpora-
tions in the improvement of their corporate governance institutions.
3
 
The question remains, however, how realistic this ambition of the OECD is and how 
satisfactory the Principles operate across the world. Since the adoption of the first ver-
sion of the Principles in 1999 researchers have examined whether and how they have 
been applied in countries of Africa and the Middle East,
4
 Europe and Asia,
5
 and Latin 
                                                 
*
 Durham University and Kent University. A previous version of this paper, dealing with the 2004 version 
of the principles, was published under the title ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 
Emerging Markets: A successful example of networked governance?’, in M Fenwick, S Van Uytsel and S 
Wrbka (eds), Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law 257-284 (Berlin: Springer 
2014). Relevant parts are reprinted with permission. We thank conference and seminar participants at 
Kyushu University (Fukuoka, Japan), Tsinghua University (Beijing, China) and the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies (London, UK) for helpful comments. 
1
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015 at p 3. 
2
 History of the OECD, available at www.oecd.org/about/history/. 
3
 For references and details see 2., below. 
4
 DA Guobadia, ‘The Rules of Good Corporate Governance and the Methods of Efficient Implementa-
tion: A Nigerian Perspective’ (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 119; AM Abu-Tapanjeh, ‘Corporate Govern-
ance from the Islamic Perspective: A Comparative Analysis with OECD Principles’ (2009) 20 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 556; Z Sharar ‘The Board of Directors of Public Companies: A Comparative 
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America.
6
 The present paper is, however, the first one that addresses the 2015 version of 
the Principles. It also different from previous research in discussing the Principles at a 
general conceptual level, while also considering the operation at the ground level. 
The corresponding structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the scene in 
providing an introduction into the evolution and core elements of the Principles. Section 
3 addresses the impact of the Principles, both in terms of state legislation and the ‘mi-
cro-level’, taking Mexico as an example. The critical assessment in section 4 examines 
the substantive fit of the Principles. It also uses the concepts of ‘networked governance’ 
and ‘wicked problems’ in order to evaluate the nature and operation of the Principles. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Evolution and core elements of the Principles 
 
The initial version of the Principles was adopted in 1999 and the revised one in 2004.
7
 
Both versions were drafted in the aftermath of financial crises, namely, the Asian finan-
cial crisis and the ‘dot-com bubble’. This was also reflected in their aims, for example, 
the Foreword to the Principles 2004 referring to the contribution good corporate gov-
ernance to financial market stability. 
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, initially, the OECD saw ‘no immediate 
call for a revision of the OECD Principles’.8 But, in 2013, in line with other discussions 
about corporate governance reform after the crisis,
9
 the OECD also initiated a revision 
                                                                                                                                               
Analysis of the Corporate Governance Framework in the State of Qatar and Australia, Measured Against 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ (2010) 1 The Legal & Judicial Journal-Ministry of Jus-
tice-State of Qatar 201, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701063; MA Al-Saeed, ‘Compliance with 
the Principles of Corporate Governance: Different Perspectives from Jordan’ (2012) 22 Global Journal of 
Management and Business Research 13. 
5
 L Tsipouri and M Xanthakis, ‘Can Corporate Governance be Rated? Ideas based on the Greek experi-
ence’ (2004) 12 Corporate Governance: An International Review 16; F Jesover, ‘Corporate Governance 
in the Russian Federation: The Relevance of the OECD Principles on Shareholder Rights and Equitable 
Treatment’ (2001) 9 Corporate Governance: An International Review 79; J Iu and J Batten J, ‘The Im-
plementation of OECD Corporate Governance Principles in Post-Crisis Asia’ (2001) 4 The Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship 47; VZ Chen, J Li and DM Shapiro, ‘Are OECD-prescribed ‘Good Corporate 
Governance Practices’ Really Good in an Emerging Economy?’ (2011) 28 Asia Pacific Journal of Man-
agement 115; IA Khan, ‘The Role of International Organisations in Promoting Corporate Governance in 
Developing Countries: A Case Study of Pakistan’ (2012) 23 International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 223. 
6
 CH Kitagawa and MS Ribeiro, ‘Governança corporativa na América Latina: a relevância dos princípios 
da OCDE na integridade dos conselhos e autonomia dos conselheiros’ (2009) 20 Revista Contabilidade & 
Finanças 61; O Alvarez-Macotela, Securities Law and Informal Redress: An Institutional Analysis of 
Equity Market Development in Mexico (1975-2005), PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 
2008, p 125. 
7
 See generally www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdprinciplesofcorporategovernance.htm. In addition, the OECD 
has published Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises and Guidelines on Multi-
national Enterprises, not discussed in this paper. 
8
 OECD, ‘Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages’ (2009) 
available at www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf. See also 
www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/corporategovernanceandthefinancialcrisis.htm.  
9
 For the discussion see, eg, J Mukwiri and M Siems, ‘The Financial Crisis: A Reason to Improve Share-
holder Protection in the EU’ (2014) 41 Journal of Law and Society 51; D Arsalidou and M Krambia-
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of the Principles. Following the parallel development of a closer cooperation between 
the OECD and the G20,
10
 the leaders of the G20 endorsed the revised OECD Principles 
in November 2015, which therefore became the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2015.
11
 
A difficult question is what forces have shaped the Principles and therefore what in-
terests they may favour. The restricted membership of the OECD means that is some-
times seen as a ‘rich man’s club’.12 However, there has also been some variation in its 
approach. When the OECD was founded in 1961, it followed a centre-left Keynesian 
line but in the 1980s it became more ‘neoliberal’, notably with a study on Structural Ad-
justment and Economic Performance in 1987 and with the unsuccessful negotiations for 
a Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the mid 1990s. Today, a mixed policy is said 
to be dominant, not least due to the strong position of European countries.
13
 Sometimes 
it is also said that the OECD is shaped by its ‘expert culture’,14 thus with its staff act-
ing with a degree of independence from the member countries. 
The drafting of the 1999 and 2004 version of the Principles has been praised as an 
example of an inclusive process that protects and promotes a wider common inter-
est.
15
 It involved a variety of other actors: the OECD’s Business and Industry Adviso-
ry Committee (BIAC) and Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) contributed to 
the drafting process, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) par-
ticipated as observers, regional roundtables and further meetings consulted with 
non-member countries, and a public consultation was conducted.
16
 A similar picture 
emerges from the process of the 2013-2015 revision: as the OECD explains, the re-
view ‘benefited from consultations with stakeholders, including the business sector, in-
vestors, professional groups at national and international levels, trade unions, civil soci-
ety organisations and other international standard setting bodies.’17 
 Despite this inclusive procedure, it has been suggested that the Principles were 
mainly shaped by the lobbying of international institutional investors, in particular 
through the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), representing institu-
tional investors who represent funds of more than 18 trillion US Dollars.
18
 This influ-
                                                                                                                                               
Kapardis, ‘Weak Corporate Governance can Lead to a Country’s Financial Catastrophe: The Case of Cy-
prus’ (2015) Journal of Business Law 361. 
10
 See www.oecd.org/g20/about.htm (it started with the G20-Pittsburgh Summit in 2009). 
11
 See www.oecd.org/daf/ca/g20-leaders-endorse-g20-oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance.htm 
12
 See 3.1, below. 
13
 See R Mahon and S McBride, ‘Introduction’, in The OECD and Transnational Governance (R Mahon 
and S McBride eds, Vancouver: UBC Press 2008) 3 at 14; R McBride and S Mahon, ‘Conclusion’, in ibid 
276 at 279. For the ongoing attempts of the OECD to liberalise investment see RA Williams, ‘The OECD 
and Foreign Investment Rules: The Global Promotion of Liberalization’, in ibid 117. 
14
 K Martens and AP Jakobi, ‘Introduction’, in Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incen-
tives for National Policy-Making? (K Martens and AP Jakobi eds,  Oxford: OUP 2010) 1 at 14. 
15
 A Baker ‘The “Public Interest” Agency of International Organizations? The Case of the OECD Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance’ (2012) 19 Review of International Political Economy 389. 
16
 See L Bouchez, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: the OECD Perspective’ (2007) 4 European 
Company Law 109 at 109-110; S Fazio, ‘Corporate Governance, Accountability and Emerging Econo-
mies’ (2008) 29 Company Lawyer 105 at 107. 
17
 See www.oecd.org/corporate/2014-review-oecd-corporate-governance-principles.htm. 
18
 T Porter and M Webb, ‘Role of the OECD in the Orchestration of Global Knowledge Networks’ in The 
OECD and Transnational Governance (R Mahon and S McBride eds, Vancouver: UBC Press 2008) 43. 
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ence could derive from the expectation that legal unification can reduce the costs of 
investing in companies from more than one country.
19
 It is also akin to the view that 
the Principles are a one-sided promotion of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance with an 
emphasis on shareholder primacy.
20
 
However, the substance of the Principles does not support such a position. In the Pre-
amble, they explain that ‘there is no single model of good corporate governance’, but 
that they aim to build on their ‘common elements’.21 This search for commonalities is 
also reflected in the Principles’ coverage of the mainstream topics of corporate govern-
ance, such as the rights of shareholders and the responsibilities of the board.
22
 In other 
instances, choices have been made: for example, the statement that there should be a 
‘sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent 
judgement’23 is based on the use of independent board members in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. By contrast, the sections on the role of stakeholders in corporate governance
24
 are 
apparently based on continental European models.
25
 
The 2015 version of the Principles kept the main substance and structure un-
changed. It added, however, a section on ‘institutional investors, stock markets, and 
other intermediaries’ with the aim to ensure the integrity of conduct in the investment 
chain.
26
 These provisions reflect recent problems, in particular for cross-border situa-
tions, as well as the general trend that questions of company and securities are increas-
ingly seen as interrelated. Similarly, the other new provisions are about new topics that 
have been discussed and/or implemented in many countries, for example, shareholder 
participation in decisions on executive remuneration, the risk oversight responsibilities 
of boards, the use of specialised board committees and the importance of board diversi-
ty.
27
 
Beyond those specific rules, it is noticeable that the Principles have been formulated 
in a general fashion. This is deliberate, as they are not supposed to be a uniform ‘Act’ 
but to offer different possibilities as to how good corporate governance practices can be 
achieved. This can also be seen in the way the Principles are meant to operate. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
The ICGN has also developed its own Global Corporate Governance Principles, see 
https://www.icgn.org/policy. 
19
 The aspiration to reduce transaction costs is a frequent topic in the literature on harmonisation: see, eg, 
U Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1997) 94, 219. 
20
 S Soederberg, ‘The Promotion of ‘Anglo-American’ Corporate Governance in the South: Who Benefits 
from the New International Standard?’ (2003) 24 Third World Quarterly 7. 
21
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, p 10. 
22
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, s II and VI. 
23
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, s VI.E1. 
24
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, s IV and VI.C. 
25
 See also Baker, supra note 15, at 397 (on compromise nature of Principles); A Kaufman and E 
Englander, ‘A Team Production Proposal to the Shareholder - Stakeholder Quarrel: The OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance’ (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030846; L Ceroni, ‘Corporate 
Governance: the OECD Principles, the Scope for a “Model of the Successful Company”, and a New 
Challenge for the Company Law Agenda and the Broader Regulatory Agenda’ (2008) 5 Corporate Own-
ership and Control 268. 
26
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, s III. 
27
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, s II.C.4, VI.D.1, E.2 and 4. 
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Fig. 1: Overview of the functioning of the Principles 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this complexity of the impact of the Principles (as well as their draft-
ing, as already discussed). In the first instance, the Principles are soft law aimed at law 
makers in less developed economies, which includes stock-exchanges as far as they de-
cide on corporate governance rules for listed companies.
28
 However, the voluntarity of 
the Principles can be reduced in practice: the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
World Bank and the IMF regard the Principles as one of the international standards 
countries are urged to adopt.
29
 The implementation of the Principles can also be the 
result of market pressure, namely as far as countries want to stimulate foreign in-
vestment.
30
  
At the level of companies, they may simply have to apply domestic laws based on 
the Principles. In addition, as far as those laws leave options for companies, the 
Principles function as guidance for good practice, in particular for larger companies.
31
 
Here too, then, it may matter that companies would be interested in implementing the 
Principles in order to attract investments, for example, by way of improving investor 
                                                 
28
 See generally H Christiansen and A Koldertsova, ‘The Role of Stock Exchanges in Corporate Govern-
ance’ (2009) 1 Financial Market Trends 1. 
29
 See 3.1, below. 
30
 Though it is doubtful whether such a positive relationship between adopting international benchmarks 
and foreign investment actually exists. See A Perry-Kessaris, ‘Finding and Facing Facts about Legal Sys-
tems and Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 649. 
31
 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, p 4 (indicating that ‘some of the Principles may 
be more appropriate for larger than for smaller companies’). 
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protection or by way reducing the costs of legal diversity.
32
 This is also fostered by the 
fact that some rating agencies use the Principles in order to rank the quality of firm-
level corporate governance.
33
 
Both these elements, the country and the firm level, will be discussed in further 
detail in the next section, using Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Russia as 
examples.  
 
 
3. The Impact of the Principles  
 
3.1 Impact on state legislation 
 
The laws of most developed countries widely correspond to the Principles.
34
 Moreover, 
as far as law makers have not incorporated all elements of the Principles, corporate gov-
ernance codes operating on a ‘comply or explain’ basis may step in. Here, the expecta-
tion is that institutional investors have sufficient expertise to monitor the right level of 
compliance with good corporate governance practices. By contrast, in other parts of the 
world – notably in countries that have (or used to have) autocratic political regimes – 
there may be insufficient experience with a distinction between rules that ‘must’ and 
‘may’ be adopted. Thus, here, it seems to be more likely that law makers simply impose 
good corporate governance standards by way of binding rules.
35
 
Another point to consider is whether a country is a member of the OECD. For exam-
ple, this may lead to a different situation for Mexico and Brazil since only Mexico is a 
member of the OECD, having joined in 1994.
36
 There have also been discussions about 
a possible membership of Brazil. In 2010, the OECD Deputy Secretary General Richard 
Boucher indicated that the OECD would ‘love to have Brazil as a member’.37 However, 
he also expressed the view that this may be contentious as the OECD ‘has historically 
been seen as somewhat of a “rich man’s club”’. Indeed a Brazilian politician even took 
the position that joining the OECD would be ‘political suicide’, claiming that Mexico 
became isolated in Latin America due to its membership of the OECD and NAFTA in 
the early 1990s.
38
 
                                                 
32
 See also Center for International Private Enterprise, ‘Impact on Reform: Corporate Governance Flyer’ 
2011, available at www.cipe.org/sites/default/files/publication-docs/corporateGovernance.pdf (‘in emerg-
ing markets all over the world, corporate governance can give companies a competitive edge’). 
33
 See H Sherman, ‘Corporate Governance Ratings’ (2004) 12 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 5. 
34
 References in M Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2008) at 227. 
35
 See also the discussion of the situation in Mexico in 3.2, below. 
36
 P Carroll and A Kellow, The OECD: A Study of Organisational Adaptation (Cheltenham: Elgar 2011) 
at 259 (noting that Mexican membership aimed to ensure regional balance as some Eastern European 
countries also joined). For the list of OECD members see 
www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm.  
37
 Brazil already participates in some of the OECD bodies. See M Schewel, ‘OECD Deputy Secretary 
General Eyes Brazil as a Potential Member’ The Inter-American Dialogue 2010, available at 
http://archive.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2306; M Ougaard, ‘The OECD’s Global 
Role: Agenda-setting and Policy Diffusion’ in Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incen-
tives for National Policy-making? (K Martens and AP Jakobi eds, Oxford: OUP 2010) 26 at 41-42. 
38
 PRLog.Org ‘Brazil would commit political suicide by joining the OECD, says ex-finance minister Ru-
bens Ricupero’ Press release 11 June 2009, available at https://www.prlog.org/10256031-brazil-would-
 7 
One of the requirements for joining the OECD is a country’s ‘positioning’ to the ex-
isting OECD instruments,
39
 also described as ‘voluntary but constrained policy trans-
fer’.40 The roadmap for Russia’s accession illustrates that a review of corporate govern-
ance policies such as the Principles can play an important role.
41
 Mexico already joined 
the OECD before the first version of the Principles was enacted in 1999. Thus, for Mex-
ico a first point to note is that the Principles are categorised as ‘recommendations’, as 
distinguished from ‘decisions’ of the OECD, meaning that they are not legally binding 
on the member countries.
42
 Moreover, the OECD has no formal enforcement powers but 
assesses the policies of its member countries by way of peer reviews and surveys. While 
some of these peer reviews evaluate the policies of a particular country in detail, the 
Principles are not included in these country studies.
43
 However, in 2011 the OECD 
started a limited thematic peer review on the application of the Principles: the six re-
ports contain interesting comparative information on selected countries and topics,
44
 
while they do not provide a clear policy assessment about the general compliance of 
particular countries with the Principles as a whole. 
In addition, we need to consider the influence of the FSB, the IMF and the World 
Bank. Both Mexico and Brazil are members of the FSB. The Principles are part of the 
so-called Compendium of Standards which the members have ‘accepted as important 
for sound, stable and well functioning financial systems’.45 Yet, the FSB does not eval-
uate the implementation of the standards itself, but considers the reviews of the IMF and 
the World Bank, namely the reports of the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) and the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).
46
 In the 
FSAP reports some references to sound corporate governance are made, yet, without 
going into details of the Principles.
47
 By contrast, the ROSCs of the World Bank exam-
ine each individual aspect of the Principles in order to assess a country’s quality of cor-
porate governance, based on a methodology developed by the OECD.
48
 This interest of 
                                                                                                                                               
commit-political-suicide-by-joining-the-oecd-says-exfinance-minister-rubens-ricupero.html (quoting the 
former Brazilian Finance Minister Rubens Ricupero). 
39
 See http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm.  
40
 Carroll and Kellow, supra note 36, at 164. 
41
 See www.oecd.org/russia/therussianfederationandtheoecd.htm and 
www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/russia. 
42
 See http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/ (search for ‘recommendations’) and www.oecd.org/legal/legal-
instruments.htm. 
43
 See www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/ and, eg, Martens and Jakobi, supra note 14, at 10-11; Porter and 
Webb, supra note 18, at 49-52.  
44
 Reports on ‘Board Practices: Incentives and Governing Risks, Corporate Governance’ (2011), ‘The 
Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance’ (2011), ‘Related Party Transac-
tions and Minority Shareholder Rights’ (2012), ‘Board Member Nomination and Election’ (2012), ‘Su-
pervision and Enforcement in Corporate Governance’ (2013), ‘Risk Management and Corporate Govern-
ance (2014)’ all available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm. A simi-
lar selective report is International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Board Independ-
ence of Listed Companies: Final Report from the Technical Committee of the IOSCO in consultation with 
the OECD’ (2007), available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD238.pdf. 
45
 See www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/index.htm. 
46
 See www.financialstabilityboard.org/activities/peer_reviews.htm.   
47
 See www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx. 
48
 See www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html; also www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx.  In 2007, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conducted a similar assessment for the 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
 8 
the World Bank in corporate governance is also reflected in the Global Corporate Gov-
ernance Forum (GCGF), in 1999 co-founded together with the OECD, and now part of 
the World Bank with the OECD as a ‘donor partner’.49 
However, the effect of the ROSCs should also not be overstated. The ROSCs are not 
conducted on a regular basis but only when a country asks for such an assessment, in 
particular, when it requires significant loans from the IMF and the World Bank.
50
 In 
2007, the OECD also published a document explaining how the ROSCs should assess 
the implementation of the Principles. Implementation is assessed in relative terms, 
namely as fully, broadly, partly or not implemented. Moreover, the OECD takes the 
view that ‘outcomes’ matter, meaning that functional equivalents are also accepted.51 
But, here then, it also needs to be considered that in practice countries may well feel that 
they should comply with the Principles in exactly the way they are phrased in the text: 
there is no catalogue of what ‘functional equivalents’ may be acceptable, and the ‘box-
ticking nature’ of the ROSCs provides an incentive to fully comply with them – and not 
to come up with a different solution. 
In the case of Mexico and Brazil, the most recent ROSCs of the Principles are from 
2003 and 2005, respectively.
52
 By contrast to more recent ROSCs of other countries, the 
assessments do not provide aggregate scores for compliance with the Principles and 
their main sub-categories. However, it can be seen that the results are somehow mixed 
with the most frequent categories ‘broadly’ or ‘partly’ implemented. This does not nec-
essarily mean that the Principles had no effect in these countries. In Mexico and Brazil 
corporate governance has become a major topic since the late 1990s. In particular, in 
both countries voluntary codes of good corporate governance have been issued and sub-
sequently updated. This process has been identified because of the Principles.
53
 Unlike 
Mexico,
54
 in Brazil a further voluntary improvement of corporate governance has been 
implemented by way of a premium segment of the stock market with a higher level of 
shareholder protection (the Novo Mercado).
55
 In a quantitative study by one of us, it has 
also been shown that the level of shareholder protection increased in both Mexico and 
Brazil between 1990 and 2013.
56
 
It is interesting to note that the World Bank’s more recent ROSCs of the Principles 
also refer to another set of indicators, namely the performance of countries in the ‘pro-
tecting investors’ indicators of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report.57 The desire 
                                                                                                                                               
(EBRD), see www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/legal-reform/corporate-governance/sector-
assessment.html. 
49
 See www.gcgf.org.  
50
 See Khan, supra note 5, at 225. 
51
 See OECD, ‘Methodology for Assessing the Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance’ (2007), available 
www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/37776417.pdf at pp 9-14. 
52
 They are available at www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html.  
53
 For Mexico see Alvarez-Macotela, supra note 6. For Brazil see Fazio, supra note 16, at 111. 
54
 See 3.2, below. 
55
 See RJ Gilson, H Hansmann and M Pargendler, ‘Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Cor-
porate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union’ (2011) 63 Stanford Law Review 475. 
56
 See D Katelouzou and M Siems, ‘Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder Protection: Leximetric Evi-
dence for 30 Countries, 1990-2013’ (2015) 15 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 127. 
57
 See, eg, World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate Govern-
ance Country Assessment - The Kingdom of Morocco, June 2010, available at 
www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosg_cg_morocco_2010_eng.pdf, at p 33. 
 9 
to reduce the differences between both sets of indicators can also be seen in the 2015 
revision of the Principles as it inserted detailed provisions on ‘related party-
transactions’ of directors and executives,58 apparently influenced by the treatment of 
this topic in the Doing Business Report.
59
  
Another, more contextual, recent approach is that the OECD starts with the Principles 
but then uses regional roundtables in order to address some of the more specific local 
problems. For example, a Roundtable for Latin America has met on annual basis deal-
ing with a variety of topics since the year 2000.
60
  
This latter trend has also led to two empirical investigations of the situation in Latin 
American countries. A paper by Carlos Henrique Kitagawa and Maísa de Souza Ribeiro 
compared the board integrity and director independence in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico.
61
 This was based on nine questions on problems outlined in the OECD White 
Paper on Corporate Governance in Latin America from 2003.
62
 With respect to the posi-
tive law, the result is somehow mixed, for instance, most of the countries have only few, 
if any, legislation on board committees; overall, however, Mexico is said to have a 
higher rate of compliance than the other three countries. 
Another study was conducted by the OECD itself, dealing with the same countries 
plus Columbia, Panama and Peru.
63
 This study uses the Principles from 2004 as a start-
ing point but also refers to the aforementioned White Paper. Here again, the result is 
somehow mixed but relatively similar in most of the countries: compliance in the main 
categories but not with regard to some of the more specific recommendations, such as 
the responsibility of boards to engage in risk management and internal evaluations. 
As both of these studies were based on firm surveys, they also address how far com-
panies actually complied with those recommendations. The need for such a law-in-
practice perspective is in line with the more general position of the OECD. It is said 
that: 
[T]he Principles should be considered a living document. It is an OECD priority 
to make sure that they are widely disseminated and actively used. This will in-
clude a continuing policy dialogue where policymakers, regulators and standard-
setters will be able to exchange practical experience of implementing the Princi-
ples.
64
 
A recent journal article by Andrew Baker has praised the Principles for such ‘experi-
mental deliberative governance’.65 It also appears plausible that in Latin America an 
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OECD-sponsored initiative called ‘Companies Circle’ has the aim to share best practice 
between companies and provide feedback to the Latin American Roundtable.
66
 Yet, the 
following will also present a more nuanced perspective of the ‘Principles in context’, 
using Mexico as an example. 
 
3.2 The operation of the Principles at the ‘micro-level’ 
 
In Mexico, the implementation of the Principles has partly been driven by the federal 
government. But the coordination efforts have also been both based on and influenced 
by networks of stakeholders. Importantly for the purpose of our analysis, those networks 
have consisted of peers (eg, gremial organisations and associations of companies by 
economic sector and by federations of businesses organisations), but also of stakehold-
ers across sectors, geographical regions within Mexico and internationally. Yet, overall, 
most influential has been a proactive attitude towards the Principles by Mexico’s gov-
ernment and by the leading financial and businesses associations. 
Mexico’s proactive approach on the topic obeys to the strategic importance that its 
membership to the OECD has represented for the Mexican government and to the prom-
ising scenario it creates for Mexico’s private sector,67 more specifically among the elite 
businesses that are capable and willing to compete in the global markets. Private sector 
efforts have been orchestrated by the Business Co-ordinator Council (CCE by its initials 
in Spanish). Mexico has also shown some leadership in matters of corporate govern-
ance: Mexico’s code of best corporate practices adopting the Principles (hereafter ‘the 
Code’) was the first in Latin America and one of the first in the world. The CCE has 
produced a number of guidelines, testimonials, practical examples in order to facilitate 
implementation of the Code and related material,
68
 being the result of intensive and co-
ordinated interplay between several domestic nodes of further networks in Mexico and 
across countries. 
The main audit firms (Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young, PwC, etc.) were actively in-
volved. Deloitte, in particular has played a leading role in the every-day implementation 
of the Principles in Mexico by means of its partnership with the World Bank and the 
Centre of Excellence in Corporate Governance (CEGC by its initials in Spanish).
69
 The 
CEGC has also developed an original Corporate Governance Index that helps compa-
nies in their self-assessment relative to the codes of best practices.
70
 Moreover, the 
CEGC publishes scores on the average compliance of Mexican firms with the Princi-
ples, thus supplementing the ROSCs which just look at the quality of implementation 
based on the positive law. 
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This variety of institutional actors is essential to the operation of the Principles in 
Mexico. However, this can also lead to complex challenges. This is not so much due to 
the number and variety of them but in view of the combination of formal and informal 
networks among those groups. For example, consider the Mexican stock market: the 
key players in this market are the financial intermediaries, listed companies and inves-
tors, plus the financial authority. Each of these groups has created formal networks 
among them.
71
 However, it cannot be assumed that those groups are defined and con-
strained by conventional borders. There is an informal overlapping of roles that conven-
tional wisdom assumes to the role played by different economic agents, in this case in-
vestors, listed firms and financial intermediaries.
72
 The roles of investors and intermedi-
aries are also blurred because of strategic alliances. Previous securities law and its en-
forcement were insufficient to upgrade the levels of trust by investors in local stock-
brokers, which partly explains an informal solution where foreign investors started par-
ticipating in the Mexican equity market by bringing with them their trusted financial 
intermediaries.
73
 
Potentially problematic is the strategy of the Mexican law maker. In 2005, it enacted 
a new securities market law (SML) and substantially revised the existing company law. 
The new SML created three new types of public companies, namely the SAPI, the 
SAPIB, and the SAB,
74
 whereby all firms listed on the MSE must be SABs. This new 
approach to securities law means that the SML ended up regulating not only listed firms 
but also some non-listed companies.
75
 It makes mandatory to comply with the Code but 
at different degrees, depending on the type of corporation. As articulated by Sam Po-
dolsky in an OECD publication: 
The new law enforces Corporate Governance for SAPIs even though they are not 
publicly traded! And (…) makes a legal obligation for publicly held corporations 
to comply with modern practices of corporate governance (it is not voluntary an-
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ymore!). This new move by the Government of Mexico, and accepted by the pri-
vate sector, represents a major advance in corporate governance in Mexico.
76
 
Though not all of these provisions are perfectly suitable for non-listed companies, the 
positive effects were apparently regarded as more significant. The blurred division be-
tween governance rules for listed and non-listed firms in Mexico has to do with the stra-
tegic role that Mexico’s government has assigned to the support and promotion of small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). As these firms employ in excess of 60 percent of 
the Mexican active population in the formal economy,
77
 the Mexican law maker took 
the view that significant economic growth can only be achieved by approximating the 
corporate governance standards of SMEs to those of large listed companies.
78
 
But, looking at two specific examples, it can be seen that there is some reluctance of 
Mexican firms to fully adopt practices of good corporate governance. First, the board of 
directors in the average listed firm has ten members, three of them usually independent 
and 3 other related to the company. Almost four out of ten board members are also 
shareholders of the firm, which shows the high percentage of family-owned firms in 
Mexico. Moreover, some of the top firms in Mexico have boards comprising more than 
15 directors, a large proportion of them hold a friendship or close personal connection 
with members of the controlling family.
79
 Second, a study by Deloitte shows that in a 
series of annual surveys among the top listed and non-listed firms in Mexico one of the 
topics where there is greater ‘opportunity’, ie failure in adoption of the Principles, is in 
the succession plan. The dominant nature of family-firms in Mexico tends to be reflect-
ed in a lack of interest to look after such theme. The negative trend identified on that 
particular topic shows a substantial gap in a culture of prevention and a business vision 
that helps to separate the family bonds from the working of the businesses.
80
 As Bruce 
Kogut explains about emerging markets: ‘governance is exercised through powerful 
clubs that constitute the social and business networks among owners, directors, and 
managers. However, the dynamics of simple behaviors can be quite surprising!’81 
India is a much similar case to Mexico in relation to which the GCGF has recently 
drawn attention.
82
 With some variations and at different degrees, all emerging markets 
share the challenge of dominant family-businesses and deep-rooted cultural traits on 
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which informal institutions relevant to corporate governance are built,
83
 a topic further 
explored in the subsequent section. 
 
 
4. Critical assessment  
 
4.1 Substantive fit of the Principles? 
 
It is difficult, or even impossible, to draft laws that are suitable for all countries of the 
world. The OECD is also aware of this problem, trying to respond to it by contextual 
initiatives such as the regional roundtables and reports.
84
 However, it remains that the 
Principles are a uniform template which, as the following will explain, does not reflect a 
model of corporate governance that can simply be applied universally. 
More specifically, it is suggested that the Principles are unsuitable for economic envi-
ronments traditionally dominated by ineffective formal institutions. Market players dif-
fer in their expectations about company and securities law depending on their character-
istics and motives to take part in the stock market and to engage in other business activi-
ties. An important difference exists between those economic agents who acknowledge 
themselves as members of a group whose dealings in the market are crucially under-
pinned by personal connections as the source of reciprocal trust (insiders), and those 
players who do not benefit from such personal ties (outsiders). Because law frequently 
fails to offer adequate protection to outsiders, informal solutions substitute and compete 
with legal institutions, sometimes in ways which are convergent with the goals of com-
pany and securities law, but often in ways which are not.
85
 
The prevalence of family-businesses and related networks is a recurrent theme in 
scholarly articles and policy-reports on the application of international corporate gov-
ernance standards in many markets.
86
 As such structures are seen as an unfavourable 
condition to the well working of the market economy, a ‘win-win solution’ could evolve 
from reinforced market governance. Yet, family firms may be disinclined to change 
their strategies simply by market pressures: ‘increased governance pressures could make 
it more costly to indulge in (…) family-centred preferences. Alternatively, better mar-
kets for corporate control could allow families to hire professional managers while 
maintaining the beneficial elements of family ownership.’87 
In an institutional context where there is no dominant rule of law, associated to lack 
of credible commitment with regards enforcement,
88
 having a family-business is an ef-
fective response to the gap in trust in the legal system. It is not a pre-condition opposed 
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neither to a professionalisation in the running of businesses nor to transparency and ac-
countability. Hence, the aforementioned unsuitability does not simply come from family 
capitalism. 
Family or other concentrated corporate ownership structures are common among 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America. Yet, the process-
es and control structures of companies from all those countries are also very different. 
Furthermore, and contrary to expectations based on the ‘globalisation/convergence’ lit-
erature, market-oriented legal and economic reforms in country level governance aimed 
at promoting investor protection, have not reduced highly concentrated ownership 
among publicly listed firms in those markets since the adoption of the Principles.
89
 
The main rules of the Principles are present in most modern company laws across 
countries as they apply to publicly traded companies. However, the degree to which 
they are observed in practice varies much between the leading OECD countries and oth-
er countries where informal institutions, corruption, and weak rule of law are dominant 
features.
90
 It follows that designing and implementing the Principles is a remarkable 
challenge. This explains the growing number of studies and guidelines in order to facili-
tate the process of integrating the Principles at the micro-level.
91 
Yet a main difficulty is 
to identify functional equivalents (whether formal or informal) in countries with differ-
ent views and values.
92
 It also needs to be ensured that the adoption of the Principles 
delivers sufficient incentives for the stakeholders and to develop practices to cope with 
country-specific features of corporate governance.
93
 
The Principles are also incompatible with institutional contexts dominated by other 
informal institutions besides family-ownership, for example, forms of corruption and 
ways to create opacity in the running of businesses and avoid accountability.
94
 The 
Principles are based on the assumption that those negative elements are usually not pre-
sent in the OECD member countries. But, for instance, some Mexican entrepreneurs do 
not find attractive the transparency imposed on public companies for entirely plausible 
reasons: a significant number of entrepreneurs whose companies could go public belong 
to strata of Mexican society targeted by organised crime. This argument has explanatory 
power in particular in the last two decades, when the quality and quantity of information 
disclosed by public companies has allowed access to sensitive information about some 
of the wealthiest families in Mexico. In this regard, company and securities laws clash 
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with a social context in Mexico where kidnapping and violet robberies became common 
and affect individuals of the upper and middle socioeconomic layers of society.
95
 
Furthermore, corporate governance was not a matter of concern for businesses and 
government leaders in institutional contexts where political rather than business ability 
used to be more decisive to success, say, in the context of a financial system where 
bankers chiefly lent to themselves and their family businesses. For example, in Mexico, 
traditionally, bankers developed the informal institution of lending primarily to them-
selves and their family members. Credit was restricted to those few entrepreneurs who 
happened to have family connections with the few people controlling banks.
96
  
However, it also needs to be noted that the situation has changed in Mexico (as well 
as other countries), as some business people want to mirror governance movements tak-
ing place in more developed countries. The pressure is also faced by newly privatised 
companies. The shift to the current interest in good corporate governance comes from a 
global movement, fostered by the World Bank and the economic literature, seconded by 
the OECD and related organisations.
97
 
In addition, whether the Principles are feasible to adopt or not is perhaps less relevant 
compared to whether they actually provide sufficient incentives to shift informal agen-
das and traditional institutions in countries emerging from weak official means of coor-
dination, high ownership concentration and dominant pyramidal control. In those insti-
tutional contexts, the role of family firms has been effective to succeed in tunnelling 
practices from the insider’s standpoint as well as in self-protecting from the risk of suf-
fering from it from the outsider’s position.98  
Finally, despite the mixed degree of suitability of the Principles at a global scale, pol-
icymakers must respond to the broader shifts in governance. There are growing signs of 
transition in modes of governance taking place from national to international spheres, 
but also flowing to sub-national and regional levels. These new forms of networked 
governance rely on international standardisation bodies complemented by local agencies 
for implementation and enforcement, as the following will explain. 
 
4.2 The governance model of the Principles: a wicked problem? 
 
This subsection will analyse and assess the Principles under the category of ‘networked 
governance’. While this is a powerful conceptual device, the following will explain that 
there is some ambiguity in the way ‘networked governance’ is understood.  
In the literature, there are a number of voices that have related the OECD to the con-
cept of networks. Yet, this has not been done in a uniform way. For example, when the 
OECD is called a ‘catalyst’ for the creation of ‘transgovernmental regulatory net-
works’,99 this could mean that the acts of the OECD, such as the Principles, are seen as 
networks. But some also seem to consider the OECD itself as a network, describing it as 
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‘an important institutional network’, being ‘part of the evolving global political super-
structure’.100 Finally, some statements refer to the relations of the OECD to other enti-
ties, calling the OECD an important ‘node in the growing networks of transnational 
governance’ and saying that the evolving networks ‘include other international organi-
zations, appointed experts, and representatives of civil society associations’.101 Notably, 
such a network may also define what it means to be a ‘modern state’.102 
It is suggested that a proper understanding of networks has to relate them to the con-
cept and challenges of governance. One pressing challenge faced by contemporary poli-
cymakers is to cope with the rising interdependence between different policy levels and 
sectors worldwide.
103
 The challenge is complex because it implies simultaneously tack-
ling other factors such as a public demand for greater accountability towards the citi-
zens, a general expectation of seeing policies that are technically feasible and acceptable 
by a new generation of stakeholders which is playing an active role in the policymaking 
processes, and (closely related to the latter) a growing demand for less vertical interven-
tions.
104
 All in all, these factors drive the quest for fresh modes of governance that are 
effective to manage the potential of networks in a given society.
105
 
Not all of the different approaches to governing large human organisations are con-
ducive to a rational exploitation of the resources pooled within those collectivities. The 
academic debate on networked governance has frequently focused on the concept of 
policy network in relation to three main modes of governance – vertical, market and 
networks: ‘vertical’ refers to a top-down structure, depending on a well-organised group 
with an effective legal system; the ‘market’ model assumes that actors effectively coor-
dinate by self-interest, yet, this depends on necessary incentives for all participants; and 
by ‘networks’ is meant a series of informal relationships between individuals who see 
each other as peers, creating an implicit understanding of membership equality and 
commitment to shared responsibilities built on trust and loyalty.
106
 These modes coexist 
and are interdependent in practice. Hence, the combination of those modalities is crucial 
since their complementarities and clashes lead to more or less successful outcomes.
107
 
The resulting notion of networked governance is built around three components:
108
 (i) 
the interplay between actors from national and international levels as well as from the 
public and private sectors; (ii) transitions in power relationships where individuals and 
new organisations are taking over the role of liaising and coordinating with stakeholders 
and becoming influential in activities previously undertook by well-established hierar-
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chical levels, and (iii) growing relevance of co-operative and peer-group decision-
making processes and ‘soft-law’.109 Therefore, the study of networks is offering a way 
towards politically acceptable means to add value to activities at the domestic level by 
working closer with countries increasingly interrelated.  
On this basis, it can be suggested that the Principles are a good example of networked 
governance and its possible benefits: they were envisioned in an inclusive process, and 
the application of the Principles involves a variety of private and public parties, often in 
a non-hierarchical way. However, against the advantages of networked governance, 
some of its potential drawbacks may be relevant to the Principles: it does not work well 
for organisations where hierarchical cultures and, thus, vertical institutions, such as 
powerful states, are markedly dominant. It is also less effective in settings where stake-
holders have dissimilar cultural values and lack of explicit common goals. In addition, 
as this governance mode coordination is built on trust and loyalty rather than adminis-
trative commands (hierarchy) or prices (markets), it matters that trust is primarily a 
spontaneous phenomenon that takes time to develop.
110
 
So what can be done about it? As research by Elinor Ostrom and others has found, 
cooperation requires trust and needs the support of trust-building institutions such as 
network management. The interaction between individual parties makes them realise the 
need for institutions and to identify interdependencies, as well as the need for monitor-
ing mechanisms and independent courts. As a result, they gradually adapt and effective 
networks emerge built on the basis of a culture of trust.
111
  
It could be suggested that such processes can take place in relation to the Principles, 
given the homogeneity among OECD members, all belonging to the wealthiest coun-
tries of the world. However, the membership of Mexico, Chile and Turkey introduces 
complexity, and deeper complexity is added by the fact that the Principles are aimed at 
both members and non-members, including countries with considerable lesser demo-
cratic and economic development, combined with much greater cultural diversity. To 
illustrate the point, we can mention the dissimilar levels of overall development, cultur-
al values and governing institutions such as the working of the law from both members 
(Mexico, Turkey, South Korea) and non-members (eg, India, Indonesia, Brazil and 
South Africa) compared to the rest of OECD members. 
Consequently, the use of the Principles implies going far beyond the task of coordi-
nating a relatively homogenous multinational network. On the contrary, the subject mat-
ter shares the features of a so-called ‘wicked problem’: it embodies many actors, many 
administrative levels, many policy phases, and many sectors.
112
 Most crucially, the 
more countries the Principles are intended to cover the greater complexity due to lack of 
homogeneity. Therefore, the coordination capacities within the multinational setting in 
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question should be seen as interrelated instead of independent. Part of the problem is 
that, if one level of governance requires the capacities of other levels for the overall sys-
tem to function effectively, it is uncertain how this affects both the design and use of the 
coordination mechanisms, as well as its efficacy. 
This ‘wickedness’ of the Principles is somehow softened by their flexible nature. 
When a country decides not to implement them, substitution by private parties will oc-
cur as far as the Principles are appropriate for the company in question.
113
 By contrast, 
making the Principles mandatory is problematic if in a particular country such an undif-
ferentiated version of global corporate governance standards does not work well for 
many of the domestic companies. Thus, in this case it is preferable to let the networked 
governance of business organisations evolve spontaneously. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Like its predecessors, the 2015 version of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance is an example of crisis-driven law making, with the explicit aim to promote fi-
nancial stability, investment and growth. A possible line of critique may be that failures 
in corporate governance have not been the main reasons of the financial crisis of 
2008,
114
 and that the empirical research of whether good corporate governance ‘matters’ 
for financial development has not produced unambiguous results.
115
 
However, regardless of this debate about causal links, it may be laudable that the 
OECD keeps the Principles up-to-date. The more valid criticism is therefore that the 
very idea of a global model of corporate governance has its flaws. The foregoing analy-
sis has shown that social, cultural and economic differences play a role at both the coun-
try and firm level of corporate governance. As the Principles are based on a common 
understanding of its member countries, they are likely to be incompatible with institu-
tional contexts dominated by informal institutions, such as family-firm governance, cor-
ruption and tricks to veil or obscure the transparency and accountability assumed as the 
basis of the Principles for the leading OECD countries.
116
 Of course, culture is not stat-
ic. It may change to adapt to the transition in circumstances, as the experience of devel-
oped countries shows.
117
 But this also requires the corresponding informal institutions, 
such as an organised civil society where stakeholder engagement plays a fundamental 
role, something which cannot be assumed in many developing countries. 
This critique invites two suggestions on how to transform the nature of the Principles. 
On the one hand, the suggestion could be to have detailed rules enacted as a binding 
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treaty of international law, but that it would then be for companies to decide whether 
they want to opt into this OECD model of corporate governance, for example, in order 
to attract international investments. On the other hand, the suggestion could be to trans-
form the Principles into a mere ‘common frame of reference’118 that has the aim to facil-
itate the discussion about corporate governance across borders. 
This first suggestion seems to have the advantage that it would also address some of 
the ambiguities of the principles, such as the vagueness of many of its provisions and 
the unclear target audience.
119
 The idea to have the same rules of corporate governance 
for companies from different countries may also refer to the European Company (SE) as 
a possible model: here too, companies are not required to use this form of company but 
can choose it if they want to do so. However, the SE also shows the practical problems 
with this approach: the common SE rules are very sketchy and few companies have ac-
tually made use of this form of company.
120
 
The second suggestion is therefore the more realistic one. It is in line with the general 
trend for more flexible forms of networked governance.
121
 Specifically, for the Princi-
ples, it can be also be supported by the view that those are a ‘living document’ and that 
regional roundtables are seen as crucial to assess the usefulness of the Principles in the 
local context.
122
 Thus, to conclude, it is suggested that, contrary to the implementation 
of the Principles in Mexico,
123
 law makers should not transform the Principles into rules 
of codified company law, but respect their nature as global soft law or even just treat 
them as a mere ‘common frame of reference’ in the ongoing debate about corporate 
governance reform. 
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